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Abstract: Using Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, this study explored the communicative processes surrounding the divorce decree in coparenting relationships in stepfamilies. Participants included 21 adults who were coparenting children in stepfamilies
who completed diary entries of all interactions with coparents over a 2-week period, and
who completed follow-up interviews. Results revealed two structures of signification with
respect to the divorce decree that enabled and constrained coparenting interactions. The
first signification structure was one in which the decree was framed as a legal document,
dictating the rights and responsibilities of parenting, especially with respect to child access
and financial issues. The second signification structure was one in which the decree was
viewed as a negotiating guide for more informal coparental decision-making processes.
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Over the last decade, family researchers have devoted substantial efforts toward understanding the complexity of stepfamily relationships (Coleman, Ganong, & Fine, 2000).
Nevertheless, researchers have stressed the need to move the research focus on stepfamilies
beyond the walls of a single household (Braithwaite, McBride, & Schrodt, 2003; Coleman
et al., 2000). Specifically, the quality of coparental relationships in stepfamilies is receiving
increased attention (Braithwaite et al., 2003), given that a high degree of conflict between
former spouses is one of the strongest detrimental influences on children and parent–child
relations (Amato, Loomis, & Booth, 1995) and that the quality of the parental alliance affects the quality of parents’ nurturing and discipline (Whiteside, 1998). Thus, our interest
in this study was on coparenting relationships in stepfamilies, defined broadly to include
any parent and stepparent, across both households, involved in the care of the children.We
considered the coparenting relationship to consist of both the ex-spousal subsystem and
the parent–stepparent subsystem in the stepfamily. Throughout this article, when we refer
to coparenting relationships and the parenting system, we are referring broadly to either
and/or both of these two subsystems, and when we refer to parents, we are including both
biological parents and stepparents.
One of the most challenging aspects of divorce for former partners involves renegotiating power and intimacy boundaries (Cole & Cole, 1999; Graham, 1997, 2003; Hardesty &
Ganong, in press), as many former spouses are in conflict throughout the divorce process
(Cole & Cole, 1999; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992). Managing these challenges becomes even
more tenuous in stepfamilies, as remarriage, for both men and women, is associated with
less frequent coparental interaction (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992), less reported parenting support from the former spouse, and more negative attitudes about the other parent
(Christensen & Rettig, 1995). Thus, developing a co-operative coparenting relationship is
one of the greatest challenges facing adults in stepfamilies (Whiteside, 1998).
At the same time, there is considerable evidence to suggest that both successful and dysfunctional coparenting relationships occur across all types of legal and residential arrangements (e.g., Kline, Tschann, Johnston, & Wallerstein, 1989; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992).As
such, researchers often view the primary function of contemporary divorce law as providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdivorce rights and responsibilities (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992). Despite this belief, however,
we know relatively little of the ways in which divorce decrees, in general, enable and constrain communication processes among ex-spouses and their new partners, potentially all
of whom are coparenting children in stepfamilies. Consequently, the primary purpose of
our investigation is to describe the various ways in which communication among adults in
stepfamilies structures the divorce decree as a meaningful basis for action in coparenting
relationships.
Communication and coparenting in stepfamilies
Researchers investigating postmarital relationships involving children have found that a
majority of ex-spouses maintain some form of direct contact well beyond the first year
after divorce (Braithwaite et al., 2003; Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992), though with time the
frequency and length of such interactions tend to diminish (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992).
In stepfamilies, the postmarital relationship is further complicated by the presence of both
stepchildren and new relational partners. For example, remarriage has been found to be
negatively associated with co-operative coparental interaction and parenting satisfaction
(Ahrons & Wallisch, 1987), as well as continued visitation with the children (Wolchik &
Fenaughty, 1996).
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To date, Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) conducted what is perhaps the most extensive
investigation of communication and coparenting. In their longitudinal study of Californian postdivorce families, they identified three basic patterns of coparenting that emerged
during the first 3 years following divorce, as well as a number of factors undermining cooperative coparental relationships. First, some coparents were disengaged, as they managed their interpersonal conflict by avoidance and made little to no effort to co-ordinate
their child-rearing activities with each other. Other coparents were best described as being
conflicted, as they maintained regular contact with each other, but were actively involved
in conflict that spilled over into the parenting domain. Finally, some coparents were able to
suppress, mitigate, or insulate their conflicts, enabling them to co-operate actively concerning the children.
In addition to these three coparenting patterns, Maccoby and Mnookin (1992) identified
a number of factors that undermine co-operative coparenting in postdivorce families, including interparental hostility, legal difficulties over custody and visitation, joint physical
custody if one or both parents wanted sole custody, incompatible values, and a general distrust of a former partner’s parenting abilities. Consequently, Maccoby and Mnookin suggested that ‘the law is simply too crude an instrument to regulate and control day-to-day
interpersonal relations; its net is not fine enough to deal with the sorts of everyday issues
that cause difficulties in coparental relations’ (p. 280). Further, these researchers expressed
doubt that changing divorce standards alone would have any influence on the way most
parents allocate basic responsibilities for day-to-day parenting, and they expressed skepticism that family law could facilitate change. There is little doubt that the divorce decree
(i.e., the formal legal agreement that grants the divorce and stipulates its terms) has some
influence on the communication among adults in stepfamilies, yet the extent to which the
decree both enables and constrains the communicative agency of coparents in stepfamilies
remains largely uninvestigated. One theory that addresses the tensions among structure,
human agency, and change, and that is particularly useful for examining the intersection of
macro-level institutions, such as the law, and micro-level interaction, such as coparenting
interaction, is Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory.
Structuration and coparenting in stepfamilies
In order to conceptualize the interplay of tensions associated with the divorce decree and
coparenting interactions in stepfamilies, we adopted Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory. Giddens’s theory begins by focusing our attention on structuration, the processes or
patterns of behavior by which social systems are produced and reproduced through members’ use of rules and resources. An important distinction within structuration theory is
that between system, which simply refers to the observable pattern of relations within a
group (such as a stepfamily), and structure, which refers to the rules and resources members use to create and sustain the system (Poole, 1999). Structures can be thought of as
‘recipes’ for acting within a given social context (Giddens, 1984), and the relations between
structure and system are represented in the concept of structuration (Poole, Seibold, &
McPhee, 1996).
At the heart of structuration theory is the duality of structure: Structure is both the
medium and the outcome of the interactions that produce social systems. Giddens (1984)
argued that structures are produced by human agency, and simultaneously, are the reproduced conditions of human agency. In other words, structures are the medium of action
because members draw on structures to interact and yet they are also the outcome of action
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because rules and resources exist only by virtue of being used in interaction. According to
Giddens, human social activities are recursive in nature, and it is only in and through their
social activities that humans reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible
in the first place. Consequently, structures both enable and constrain human interaction,
as structural properties constituted in both rules and resources express forms of domination and power. Ultimately, Giddens viewed structural expressions of power as dialectical
in nature and he offered the dialectic of control to help explain the two-way character of
power, as the less powerful manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the
more powerful in established power relationships.
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of structuration theory, however, is that it examines
the link between social institutions at the macro-level of analysis and human interaction
at the micro-level of analysis. Although family members may create certain structures that
are unique to their own stepfamily system, more often structures are appropriated by the
stepfamily from social institutions, such as larger political, economic, religious, or cultural institutions. This aspect of structuration theory is especially germane to our present
inquiry, as the appropriation of the divorce decree from the larger legal institution may
facilitate coparenting interactions in stepfamilies. The term appropriation refers to a process whereby family members adopt structural features from a particular institution and
develop a situated version of them (Poole et al., 1996). As Poole and colleagues noted, the
appropriation of structural features is a skill that results in different versions of institutional features being adapted to specific contexts. To address this process, Giddens (1984)
highlighted three modalities that connect levels of human interaction with larger social
structures and institutions.
First, Giddens (1984) suggested that institutional features may operate as interpretive
schemes in communication processes, referred to as structures of signification. Structures
of signification invoke certain symbolic orders, modes of discourse, and language that ultimately are only understood in connection with the two remaining structures. Structures
of domination refer to institutional features that facilitate power and influence, invoking
the resource authorization provided by political institutions and the resource allocation
afforded by economic institutions. Finally, institutional features may operate as norms that
guide behavior and undergird judgments about others, referred to as structures of legitimation. Structures of legitimation invoke the sanctioning of certain behaviors afforded by
legal and religious institutions, as well as by ethical standards and societal customs. It is
important to note that, although Giddens identified three distinct structures, the distinction is largely analytical and the three elements tend to overlap in every action (Poole et
al., 1996).
Overall, then, structuration theory provides an appropriate theoretical lens for examining the various ways in which coparental communication produces and reproduces the
divorce decree as a meaningful basis for action within the stepfamily. In general, many
divorced parents are unable to develop co-operative coparenting relationships as they negotiate in light of previously established legal standards provided by the divorce decree
(Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992).These challenges are further complicated by the presence of
new relational partners in stepfamilies, and thus, the influence of the divorce decree as
a structure of stepfamily interaction warrants investigation. In the present study, we addressed the potential influence of the divorce decree on coparenting relationships in stepfamilies by examining the various ways in which communication generates and sustains
implicit structures that determine how the decree is interpreted and implemented.
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Method
Participants
The data were collected as part of a larger investigation of communication patterns among
coparenting adults in stepfamilies across two households.We recruited participants who
met the following criteria: First, participants must have been either a parent or a stepparent
of a child who resided in a stepfamily household; second, (step)parents in both households
must have been active in raising their child(ren) (i.e., children spent at least some time in
each household per week). Guided by these two criteria, then, we sought parents and stepparents coraising children in stepfamilies via a convenience, snowball sample
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Given that we were asking participants to both keep a diary for 2 weeks and participate
in an interview, we faced challenges finding those who were willing to complete the entire
study. In the end, 21 participants (representing 18 stepfamilies) completed both parts of the
data-collection process. Of these, 14 were female and 7 were male, with a mean age of 42
years. All but one of the participants were Caucasian, and that participant was Latino. Ten
of the participants identified themselves as parents (4 females and 6 males), and eleven of
the participants were stepparents (10 females and 1 male). In terms of education, the participants ranged from a high-school equivalent diploma to a PhD, with 8 having earned
some sort of graduate degree.The mean length of the stepfamilies was 6.35 years with a
range from two years to 12 years. The number of children in the stepfamilies ranged from
1 to 6, with a mean of 2.95 children.
Ideally, we would have preferred the participation of multiple adults from each family.
However, in the end, four participants were a part of the same stepfamily (two separate
households). In both cases, these participants were currently married to each other.When
we inquired of other participants about involving other members from the same stepfamily in the study, many expressed reluctance about adults in the other household participating in or knowing about the project because it might jeopardize the delicate nature of their
relationships and interactions. Because of ethical concerns, we honored their wishes in
such cases and made no attempt to contact others in the family.
Procedures
We approached the current study from an interpretive paradigm, with the central goal
of seeking understanding and intelligibility by focusing on similarities in meanings from
the perspective of actors themselves (Baxter & Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 1998; Kvale, 1996;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985), looking for what Bochner (1985) described as the ‘informal logic of
social life’ (p. 44).
To meet this goal, we employed the Diary–Diary Interview method (Zimmerman &
Weider, 1977, 1983), which consists of asking participants to keep an interaction diary for
a specified period of time and then to participate in an interview that covered both the
diary entries and additional questions researchers wish to explore. This method has been
used successfully by family communication researchers seeking to track family members’
interactions over a period of time (e.g., Leach & Braithwaite, 1996). Zimmerman and Weider (1977) argued that one goal of this method is to position research participants ‘as both
observer and informant’ (p. 484), and that diaries ‘approximate observation’ in difficultto-observe settings (such as stepfamilies) by providing ‘annotated chronological records’
(p. 116) of interactions. By using this method, we were able to collect data on participants’
interactions through 2 weeks of diary entries and explore meanings they placed on their
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interactions with adults in the other household through the interviews. This study emphasizes the interview data, because it provided insight into the meanings of the individual
interaction events.
We collected data in two phases. First, we asked participants to keep an interaction diary each time they interacted with the adults in the other household over a 2-week period.
Because we were interested in both the ex-spouse or the parent–stepparent subsystems,
we allowed participants to be either biological parents or stepparents. In each diary, participants reported about the interaction (who contacted whom, through what channel, the
length, reason for interaction, and topic of interaction). For each interaction, they also reported their perceptions of conversational effectiveness, satisfaction, level of conflict, and
overall feelings regarding the interaction (through semantic differential questions). The
number of diary entries completed by each participant ranged from 1 to 23, with a mean of
6.91 entries over the 2-week period.
In the second phase of the Diary–Diary Interview method, we conducted semistructured, focused interviews (Spradley, 1979), allowing for the flexibility to probe for deeper
understanding and to perception check as necessary (Kvale, 1996). Zimmerman and Weider (1977) noted that ‘the diary interview converts the diary – a source of data in its own
right – into a question gathering and, hence, data-generating device’ (p. 489).We began our
diary interviews by asking participants to expand upon the information in the interaction
diary entries. Specifically, we asked them to reflect on whether the diary entries reflected
typical patterns of interaction, and we asked questions that probed for more information
than that provided in the diaries. Additionally, we asked participants about past conflicts,
episodes that required planning (such as visitation and holidays), and other types of interactions that occurred with adults in the other household. As noted earlier, the data were
collected as part of a larger investigation on communication and coparenting in stepfamilies, and thus, we had not singled out the divorce decree in our interview guide; rather, this
structure emerged as a central topic in participants’ discourse concerning coparenting and
their stepfamily experiences. The interviews lasted 45 to 90 minutes each and yielded 391
pages of single-spaced interview transcripts for analysis, in addition to the diary entries.
The fact that we did not a priori expect that the divorce decree would emerge as an important construct, and that we did not specifically ask about it, makes it even more noteworthy
that it achieved such a central place in our findings.
Data analysis
We approached data analysis with theoretical sensitivity, which Strauss and Corbin (1998)
conceptualized as approaching data with an ‘open mind’ but not an ‘empty head’ (p. 47).
In other words, we did not force the data into categories, but we were aware of the major
concepts of structuration theory when analyzing these data. The data analysis process was
completed in several steps. First, the researchers individually read through the transcripts
holistically several times and met to discuss the identified themes. Second, the researchers
read through the transcripts, specifically noting structures that emerged. Third, three of the
researchers used the inductive process of analytic coding (Lindlof, 1995) to compare data
for similarity and differences. When a given datum was perceived to be different from prior data, a new category was added, and the process was repeated until no new categories
were required. The researchers then shared their categories and discussed similarities and
differences among their derived categories, including exemplars of the different categories
in their analysis. Next, one researcher took the analyses, found connections among them,
and refined the categories and chose exemplars for the final research report. Finally, all
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five of the researchers analyzed these results critically to check the team’s analysis and to
confirm that the exemplars accurately represented the findings.
Results
Participants evidenced two structures of signification with respect to the divorce decree.
Structures of signification, as Giddens (1984) conceives them, are interpretive schemes or
‘recipes’ that provide rules and resources for communicative action. The first signification
structure was one in which the divorce decree was framed as a legal document.The second
signification structure was one in which the divorce decree was viewed as a negotiating
guide or backdrop for more informal coparental decision making. In turn, structures of
legitimation and domination were interwoven with these two signification structures.
The divorce decree as legal contract
The signification structure of divorce decree as legal contract was predicated on the belief
that coparenting actions were matters of law, dictating absolutely the rights and responsibilities of parenting, especially with respect to child access (e.g., custody and visitation
rules) and financial issues related to the children (e.g., support payments, college savings
funds). Sanctioning against violations was enacted by parental use of the court system as a
primary resource. Illustrative of the legal-contract scheme is a statement from a stepmother, married to a father who does not have primary custody of the children from a former
marriage. The stepmother indicated to the interviewer that the divorce decree ‘loom[s] into
our lives’ (#21, 425):1
We pick them up from school 2 days a week, and they’re with us until about 10
pm. But they spend every weeknight at their mother’s house. And then we have
them every other week-end . . . There’s this sort of rigid pattern of child-sharing
. . . She basically has the kids for the traditional holidays at the traditional times,
and this is something my husband resents. Ya know, like Thanksgiving, she’ll
have the kids for dinner but we might see them in the morning or something.
Christmas, she has the kids on Christmas Eve and Christmas morning, but
they’ll come to our house around 2 o’clock. So we tend to see them on all major
holidays . . . but not at the times when family traditions are usually taking place.
(#21, 164–167, 405–421)
In this excerpt, the stepmother is describing the access rules that determine when she
and her husband have visitation rights. Apparently, her husband is not pleased with these
rules of access, particularly surrounding holiday time, yet this pair feels legally constrained
by them.
Financial support was the other primary domain in which the legal-contract structure
was reported. One nonresidential father described, in part, how financial arrangements
were determined by the legal contract of the divorce decree:
Well, it is explicit in the divorce decree. That has helped a lot. So, for example, she
takes care of the health insurance because the kids get a tuition exchange, a tuition
remission. I take a tax deduction for the kids as they come of age, and there is also
an item agreement that we will split all unusual costs . . .We really haven’t argued
about that [financial matters] . . .The agreement itself is pretty explicit. (#9, 143–194)
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In this excerpt, the children’s father is sharing with the interviewer that there are explicit
item agreements in the divorce decree that determine coparenting financial responsibilities. Unlike the stepmother quoted earlier, this parent felt positively about the explicitness
of the divorce decree. These positive and negative reactions toward the divorce decree as a
legal contract are important markers of Giddens’s (1984) observation that structures function both as enablements and as constraints.
The legal contract as enablement. For some stepfamilies, the divorce decree as legal contract facilitated smooth functioning in the coparenting system of both biological/adoptive
parents and their respective new partners. For these coparenting systems, the legal-contract structure provided a depersonalized and tightly regulated set of rules for parenting,
thereby alleviating parental disagreements, disputes, and conflict. One stepmother, who
lives in a household with a father and his son from a former marriage, shared with us her
belief in the court system, the institutional mechanism by which the legal contract is determined, as a way to resolve ongoing conflicts about child support between her husband
and his former spouse:
The best way to go about it was to just go through the courts because that eliminates all these threats and all of that verbal stuff that goes on when there’s a
lot of anger and frustration. So he [her husband] just went to court, got a court
order, then they went again to a court-ordered mediation. At the mediation, she
agreed to sign a contract, which was a legal contract, and she just had to make
her [payments]. (#4, 135–139)
In this same coparenting system, the stepmother and her husband strategically relied
on e-mail rather than face-to-face exchanges with the former spouse:‘ We choose to use email because then we can get a point across and not have her hang up on us or anything,
or get upset and swear at us . . . Plus then we have it in writing, and when we have to go
to court, which we frequently do, then, it’s all in writing. So, it’s just a protection for us’
(#4, 96–122). For this stepmother, the divorce decree as legal contract was viewed as a set
of legally binding rules that limited ongoing conflict between parents. When parents were
bound by the contract, they reasoned, it was not subject to dispute. Should one parent
violate the contract, the court system functioned as the primary resource through which
compliance was achieved.
Other members of stepfamilies shared the view that the legal-contract structure functioned positively in the coparenting system by limiting conflict. One nonresidential father summarized how the legal contract enabled functional communication between the
two parenting households: ‘I think that in many cases the rules are there so they work
best when the individuals are not speaking. The rules become explicit and people can say,
“Look, this is what it says and here is when I am going to come so get out of my life”’ (#9,
500–508).
The legal contract structure provided a resource to prevent, or resolve, conflicts between
coparents. In turning to the language of the contract, a coparenting household could close
down efforts by the other household to disagree with, or challenge, parental rights.
Within the signification structure of a legal contract, the divorce decree was perceived to
have the advantage of clarity in articulating parental rights and responsibilities. However,
such clarity and predetermination were a double-edged sword.
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Legal contract as constraint. Many coparents reported that the legal contract lacked flexibility for the needs of parents and children alike.When a coparent was perceived as unwilling to negotiate an exception in response to changing circumstances, the divorce decree was perceived as a resource of domination, used by him or her to control the other
coparent’s access to the child or the particulars of their financial support. One residential
stepmother (P) of a teenaged stepson provided the following account (to an interviewer,
I) of how the nonresidential mother was perceived to use the language of the decree as a
structure of domination:
P:We were scheduled to go on vacation. And, the vacation fell over the weekend that John [the stepson] was to see his mother, and she had agreed to switch
with us. We had given her time with John prior to our vacation. A snowstorm
hit and we didn’t go on vacation, ’cause we were driving. So we didn’t go, and
I said, ‘Well then call your mother and have her come up, and you need to go
be with your mom,’ and he refused because he didn’t want to go see his mother.
And I didn’t probably insist that he go, I just thought ‘OK, he doesn’t want to,
fine.’ It wasn’t any big thing . . . every time he goes from one place to another
he’s living two different ways and he just wanted to chill out for a week. He just
wanted to be where he was, do what he wanted, and not have to conform to
our ways or her ways. Anyways, she found out that we were chilling out rather
than on vacation, and so, she took us to court, for contempt. Yeah, because of the
fact that it was her week-end even though we had already given up our weekend at a previous time.
I: So, she had already had the substitute week-end, but since this was still supposed to be the official week-end . . .
P: Right, and it was a court order and there was no way that we could prove
that she previously, even though the child and the father said that she had already had this week-end, the judge said, ‘No, it isn’t a matter of people getting
to pick and choose. This is a court order, you obey it.’ And then [the father] told
[the mother], ‘You really put me in a difficult position, and you’re walking on
real thin ice.’ ’cause it really isn’t contempt. I mean it’s not like somebody was
deliberately trying to break a court order. But, the law is the law. (#4, 498–527)
In this unexpected circumstance, the stepmother thought it was acceptable for her stepson to stay, especially given that she and her husband had been true to the spirit of the
decree by trading week-ends. However, the mother was upset by the act of ‘contempt’ of
the divorce decree, and she used the court system, and the clarity of the divorce decree
contract, as a way to sanction her former husband. The boy’s father thought the mother’s
behavior was clearly inappropriate, but ‘the law’ was not on his side. Interestingly, the
stepmother and her husband were apparently not upset with the judge; rather, their anger was directed at the mother, who was perceived to have taken unfair advantage of the
stipulations of the decree. Whether ill-intentioned or not, the mother’s agency in suing her
ex for contempt functioned as a structure of domination in controlling compliance with
the court order.
Sometimes, the constraint was reciprocal, as each coparenting household used, or threatened to use, the legal contract of the divorce decree as a structure of domination against
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the other. Illustrative of such reciprocal attempts at control was this account provided by a
residential father, divorced for 14 years. At the time this episode transpired, their son was
living with his mother:
She [his ex-wife] mentioned that they were looking at moving to Kansas City.
And I said that I was going to fight that and take it to court. And she’d have to
take it to court to get him [their son] out of state anyway, so, um, I was going to
fight for custody and try to get him back. And I ended up talking to [his ex-wife’s
current husband] in the process, and it just came down to a, ‘Well, if I, if we want
to do it, we’ll end up doing it and you’ll end up losing.’ And, I didn’t back off to
where I said, ‘Well, that’s OK, you can have him.’ I kept stating that I was going to
fight it and push it, partly knowing that . . . just hoping that she would back off, I
guess, ’cause I didn’t know whether I had the financial resources to try to do that
anyway, and I probably would end up losing him. (#6, 424–433)
Although constraint often was experienced as a structure of domination situated in the
efforts of the other coparent to use the divorce decree as a weapon, constraint was often
attributed directly to the decree itself and the court system that legitimated it. For example,
a nonresidential father described how he attempted to use the court system to control his
ex-wife’s abuse of the decree’s stipulations, but the story takes an interesting turn, ending
with the judge and the decree functioning as a structure of domination over both parents:
Maybe I should tell you about how I had to go to court. [My ex] sees Christmas as
when her extended family celebrates it. They celebrate Christmas Eve, Christmas
Day, and sometimes the day after. Our decree says that one year she has them for
Christmas Day and one year I have them for Christmas Day.This is my year to have
them for Christmas Day, and I said, ‘Let’s figure out a time.’ It would be 8 or 9 in
the morning to 8 or 9 at night.Well, she e-mailed me and said Christmas is when
her family celebrates Christmas so you will get them the 27th. So I went to court
to get them on Christmas Day.What was even sillier was the judge’s decision. He
agreed that I should have them on Christmas Day – midnight until midnight – and
next year with midnight to midnight, I said [to the ex], ‘You know, this is stupid.
Let’s just do 8 o’clock to 9. They are just going to be sleeping [at midnight]’ . . . so
we finally agreed to that. (#8, 798–846)
This father initially used the legal-contract structure as a resource to change his access to
the children at Christmas time, but the language of the judge’s ruling (midnight to midnight) was overly rigid and proved to be an unreasonable constraint on parents and children alike. So the parents were able to construct an alternative structure that worked better
for them. They used the legal contract as a guideline against which they negotiated an alternative access rule, abandoning the literal language and mandate of the legal document.
This father’s story is a typical one in our interviews. When the domination structure
was the divorce decree itself, rather than the other coparent’s use of that decree, coparents
were motivated to transform the meaning of the divorce decree from a legal contract to
a different signification structure – one we label a guide. In this alternative signification
structure, coparents did not use the decree as a legally binding contract. Instead, it was a
backdrop or framework for negotiation in which partners were free to alter the stipulations
of the decree if they could informally agree on an acceptable course of action.
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The divorce decree as a guide
In the guide structure, legitimation hinged not on following the letter of the divorce decree
but on good faith efforts to maintain the principle of fairness with the interests of the children first and foremost. A stepmother discussed these principles as a legitimation structure
for the guide scheme, and why she and her fellow coparents preferred it over the legal
contract mentality:
We need to work it out, because otherwise there will be a lot of hostility, there
will be a lot of anger, and if we work things out as we go, things down the road
are gonna be easier. If we don’t work things out, the more stuff that we say,
‘nope, we can’t reach a compromise, just go by the decree,’ the more things
down the road are going to get more and more like that and it’s just gonna
be this snowball effect that is just gonna make things worse and worse as we
go along. So, we all kinda have the same opinion that if we try to work things
through the best we can, and try to be civil, then everybody benefits.The children benefit the most, and the adults benefit too, because then they’re not, ya
know, feeling like they’re not getting their way, or they’re being discriminated
against or whatever . . . it just benefits everybody involved. (#3, 534–552)
These coparents appeared to endorse the spirit of co-operation directed at the children’s
interests, viewing the legal contract structure as adversarial, and thus ultimately counterproductive.
Another parent, a nonresidential father, described the fairness principle of the guide
structure in terms of how their daughter was to divide time between households for the
holidays. Plans were unsettled because of travel on the part of both parents:
What I think is going to happen is I am going to talk to [my ex-wife] and tell
her the situation, check with her to see if or when she is going to Philadelphia
and then try out the possibility that we could have her for Thanksgiving this
year. See if there is something in return we could give her for that . . .You sort of
bargain, but bargain makes it sound too formal. I am asking for something, so I
am willing to give something up to what works for her as well. (#15, 515–529)
This father talked about bargaining, not in a formalized, legally bound way, but in the
spirit of good faith.
The guide as enablement. Coparents often exercised agency to suspend the legally binding constraint of the divorce decree when they found the language of the decree too rigid
and inflexible in response to their needs. When coparents were able to liberate themselves
from the contract, their coparenting system was often functional, enabling responsiveness
to everyone’s needs. A residential mother reported that she and her ex suspended the legally determined access rule, because it often did not work for the father’s schedule:
We are supposed to rotate holidays and stuff like that, but it doesn’t always
work for him. If it is my holiday and he wants them, what I generally do is, I
visit with the kids to see if it is OK with them and say I know it is mine, but
he wants you. Do you care if you go? That is how we generally work it out,
through the kids. (#2, 185–188)
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When it came to financial arrangements, however, the legal-contract structure still prevailed:
We had to go back to court ’cause he [her ex] was trying to modify the support. That is pretty touchy. You know, he doesn’t see them on a regular basis,
he doesn’t go out of his way to buy them things or call them on their birthdays
or anything. In my eyes, if he could walk away from paying support he would.
This is just how selfish he is. (#2, 332–338)
This mother and father suspended the legal-contract structure in favor of a guide structure, but only on a situation-by-situation basis. Thus, the signification structure of this family, like others in our sample, was a mixture of both legal contract and guide, depending
on the issue at hand.
This mixture of both legal contract and guide is illustrated by the following excerpt from
a stepmother whose household has custody of the children 40% of the time. When asked
how she went about trying to balance competing household needs or wants for child access, she said:
Well, by being sensitive to the fact that [my husband] would have liked [his
sons] to stay and also being aware that [the mother] wants them over there. Just
trying to be aware of what the legal arrangements are, but then also what is the
right thing to do. And trying to initiate what is right without having a fight . . .
Once I realized that we [herself and the mother] were going to be cordial with
each other, things just got more relaxed . . . Except for all the custody arrangements, but that is their divorce and that is their deal. The kids are all ours, all of
our responsibility. (#10, 255–262, 454–457, emphasis added)
This stepmother indicated that the 60–40 custody split was honored to the letter of the
law, but within that parameter, the coparenting system consisting of the biological parents
and the stepparents tried to function informally by responding to what the children needed. Her reference to ‘their’ versus ‘our’ marked the clear demarcation between the contract
and guide significations. Thus, on such matters as homework, curfew enforcement, and
household chores, the four parents worked as a single, co-ordinated team on behalf of
the children’s best interests. The issue of custody was bracketed out of the domain of the
contract signification.
Children functioned with increasing agency in reaction to the legal-contract structure,
especially when they reached adolescence. Further, many parents were willing to shift to
a guide structure in response to the expressed wishes of their children, especially when
children reached adolescence. Illustrative of this shift is this account provided by a nonresidential father of a teenager:
[The daughter] lived half time in each household for a number of years: 6. As she
got older she increasingly wanted to live in one household and just visit the other
one. So she decided to live at her mom’s household and we were trying to come
up with some way to do this that would be OK with [the daughter] and OK with
me. It would keep me active in parenting her. Part of that arrangement was that
[the mother] and I would have monthly meetings face to face so we could talk
about issues that came up and plans and strategies and so forth. (#15, 108–114)
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Although the father preferred the half-time access he was granted by the divorce decree,
he and his ex-wife negotiated a new way to sustain his parenting role, involving less time
with the daughter and more time in discussion and decision making with the mother.This
change was motivated by a mutual desire to be responsive to their child’s wishes to suspend the stipulations of the divorce decree.
A minority of coparenting systems had relied solely on the divorce decree as a guide.
Coparents reported that relations were co-operative and good faith had always prevailed
in co-ordinating parenting issues. One nonresidential father, divorced for 5 years, invoked
the metaphor of how a business is run to describe the coparenting system:
It feels kind of like a business . . . The children are kind of our business together
and I can respect that [other] person . . . Anybody can always pick up the phone
and communicate about the girls and what’s happening. Our daughters come
and go as they please. They are welcome to stay any week-end anywhere or during the week.They get to make those choices. (#14, 614–617)
In the coparenting ‘business,’ the coparents are not friends but business partners. As
such, they form a business-like team whose purpose is to raise the children. The teenagers
have an active voice in determining parental access.
Many adults in coparenting systems realized that the informality of the guide structure
could function to constrain or limit positive coparent relations. Thus the guide structure,
like the legal contract, functioned as both enablement and constraint.
The guide as constraint. One disadvantage of the guide structure was that it created the
opportunity for coparents to abuse good-faith principles. Such violations functioned as
structures of domination, as one coparent was perceived to control the situation in favor of
his or her own individual interests. One important way bad faith could be displayed was
in attempts to manipulate or use the child. One mother discussed with the interviewer her
former husband’s pattern of attempting to lengthen his time with their children:
Like they would stay one day longer and he would call and say, ‘I talked to the
kids and they want to stay two days longer. So we’re going to stay two days longer.’ And what I knew that he did was to the kids he would say, ‘Oh, I miss you so
much please stay a day longer’ and they would feel bad for him and they would
say, ‘Yes’ and not honor their true feelings. So, I had to be strong. And actually
[the daughter] has told me many times that she never wants the parenting schedule to change. Like we would go to my son’s concerts at school and he would, the
kids would be with me, and he would say to [my daughter], ‘I miss you so much.
Why don’t you just come home with me and I’ll take you to school tomorrow?’
And that would put so much pressure on her. She would actually get sick and say
to me, ‘Mom, I’m going to throw up or something.’ (#23, 225–288)
Once the mother perceived that her ex was manipulating the children in order to gain
more access to them, she refused to negotiate flexibility in the decreed access rule. In short,
she perceived a violation of the good-faith spirit of the guide structure, and resorted back
to a legal-contract structure as a resource to protect her children.
When the good faith negotiations of the guide structure malfunctioned, for whatever
reason, coparenting systems often moved back to the legal contract structure. A stepmoth-
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er spoke of how the coparenting system worked when they were unable to reach agreement about how to handle the holidays:
At that point, it’s basically up to whatever the decree says.We usually try to accommodate what the people want for holidays, ya know, ‘cause when you’ve
got other family members to get together with the children and stuff you really
try to make it work. And there have been times in the past where my husband
hasn’t wanted to give them up on Christmas Eve to accommodate her schedule
because then we’re not able to take them to Christmas Eve service at our church
with us . . . so he will just flat out say, ‘We can’t reach an agreement. I want them
on my day, and we can’t come up with a compromise so we’re just gonna have
to go with what the decree says.’ But, ya know, that’s very, very rare . . . (#3,
69–89)
Sometimes, the guide structure was perceived to work because there was conscious
awareness of the option to resort to the legal-contract structure should informal negotiations fail. A residential stepfather provided this account of why he thought the nonresidential father was so co-operative in their informal guide with respect to financial support:
He pays his child support and I think the reason he does that, between you and
me and the gatepost, is he don’t [sic] want her going back to court to get more .
. . If the doctor bills get a little high or something, he’ll chip in extra. Or like the
girls now are playing instruments, and they are not cheap. He will kick in a little
bit on those and we get along fine. We have no problems. (#11, 70–75)
To this stepfather, the nonresidential father provided extra, voluntary financial support
in a fair manner. However, he attributed such generosity not to the father’s sense of what
was fair but to the possibility that he would be taken back to court. The legal-contract structure thus functioned as a latent threat to enable informal co-operation between coparents.
Discussion
In this study, we used a multifaceted methodological approach, the Diary–Diary Interview
method, framed within Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory to further our understanding of communication processes among coparents in stepfamilies. When we interviewed
participants regarding their diary records of coparenting interactions across households,
we were struck by how salient the divorce decree was as a structure that guided these
interactions. Although legal scholars have written about the legal aspects related to the
divorce decree, we know of no studies that have examined how this document structures
communication among coparents in stepfamilies, both in terms of facilitating it and hindering it, and in turn, how communication produces and reproduces the meaning of the
divorce decree. An additional contribution of our study is that we examined communicative processes and structures across the households represented, not just within the confines of a single home.
In general, we found two primary ways that the divorce decree structured, and was
structured by, coparenting interactions. First, the divorce decree was considered by some
of our participants to be a legal document that dictated each parent’s rights and responsibilities with respect to the children. As a legally binding document, this structure served as
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an absolute mandate regarding appropriate and inappropriate parenting behavior. Among
the participants in our sample, the divorce decree either facilitated coparental communication because it provided an objective standard for parental behavior, or it hindered
coparental co-operation because it was used inflexibly and rigidly by one parent to exert
control over the other.
The second way that the divorce decree functioned as a structure for these families was
as a guide. In such instances, the divorce decree served as a structure that provided some
guidance, but was not rigidly adhered to in every detail. Typically, the divorce-decree-asguide structure worked effectively to foster co-operation among coparents, but, at times,
one coparent was perceived as taking advantage of the other’s good-faith efforts. Deviating from the tenets of the divorce decree requires considerable mutual trust, because there
is no institutional enforcement mechanism when coparents choose to find their own solutions to childrearing issues. When one parent perceived that this trust was violated, there
was often a return to the structure of the divorce decree as a legal document to resolve
disputes. Thus, even when the divorce decree was used as a guide, the parents’ realization
that the legal structure of the divorce decree was available either helped them to negotiate
flexibly in good faith or it provided a legal resolution to parenting disputes if one parent
perceived that the other was taking advantage of the other’s good will. Our results support
Maccoby and Mnookin’s (1992) observation that the law is too ‘crude’ to govern daily human interaction, and therefore cannot replace the human tendency to work out problems
in mutually acceptable ways, even if these deviate from the divorce decree.
Our results are suggestive of three possible types of coparenting teams in these data,
categorized according to how the divorce decree was structured: (a) Guide-emphasis coparenting teams, the least common in our sample, were able to function positively and
collaboratively, and thus, used the divorce decree as a guide, not as a legally binding legal contract; (b) legal contract-emphasis coparenting teams attempted to remain true to
the legal stipulations embedded in the divorce decree, either finding some comfort in the
structure provided by the decree and/or feeling the need to follow the decree rigidly even
though it constrained positive coparental interactions; and (c) mixed coparenting teams,
the most common category in our sample, who used the decree as both contract and guide,
depending on their perceptions of whether the other party was coparenting fairly and flexibly. When both parents perceived that the other was functioning in good faith, they were
able to use the decree as a guide only, but, when the parties were perceived as being unfair
or rigid, at least one party felt the need to resort to using the decree as a contract.
These tentatively identified coparenting types bear some similarity to the typology
derived by Maccoby and Mnookin (1992). Our guide-emphasis coparents resemble Maccoby and Mnookin’s co-operative coparents, who are able to transcend their conflicts to
work collaboratively to raise their children. Our legal contract-emphasis coparents appear
similar to Maccoby and Mnookin’s disengaged coparents, who function in parallel, avoid
each other, and perhaps rely on the divorce decree as a contractual structure to guide their
interactions. Finally, our mixed coparents have some commonalities with Maccoby and
Mnookin’s conflicted coparents, who are actively engaged with each other, but who have
periodic conflicts that affect their parenting. We speculate that such parents may feel the
need to resort to the divorce decree as a legal structure during these conflictual episodes.
Because these two classification schemes have the potential to enrich each other, we hope
that future research will explore the correspondence between them.
Our results provide support for the utility of applying Giddens’s (1984) structuration
theory to the stepfamily context (Krone, Schrodt, & Kirby, 2006). In fact, using structura-
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tion theory as a conceptual framework helped us identify salient aspects of how the divorce decree is used in stepfamilies, such as directing us to explore how the divorce decree
as a structure both facilitates and hinders communication between coparents. Because the
divorce decree is developed in conjunction with the judicial system, structuration theory’s
emphasis on how people appropriate structures from social institutions was particularly
helpful. In addition, our findings exemplify several features of structuration theory.
First, as Giddens (1984) argued, structures of signification, domination, and legitimation are interwoven in complex ways in stepfamilies, such that at different times, and
perhaps even at the same time, the divorce decree serves as a societal symbol of the
divorce settlement, a means of exerting power over another member of the coparenting system, and a set of socially (and legally) sanctioned norms to guide coparenting
behaviors in stepfamilies. Our data clearly revealed that the divorce decree serves each
of these purposes in sometimes separate and sometimes integrated ways. Second, Giddens suggested that there is a recursive relationship between human interaction and
structures, such that the interactions among individuals affect the development of a signification structure, and, in turn, the signification structure influences interactions. Our
results illustrated that the coparents, as well as the larger social institutions involved in
the divorce process, determined the nature of the divorce decree. In turn, the divorce
decree then influenced, as either a guide, a legal contract, or both, the coparenting interactions in the stepfamily system. In addition, given that the divorce decree can and often
is modified by court order (through motions to modify the decree), the reciprocal nature
of the interaction–structure relationship becomes even more salient when the decree is
legally modified over time.
Finally, structuration theory emphasizes the importance of both human agency and
structure, indicating that the course of human interaction is determined by a complex interplay between individuals who are proactively creating and using structures to guide
their behavior and the developed structures, in turn, influencing individuals’ behavior.
In the present study, we found numerous examples of how these coparents found creative (and agentic) ways to co-operatively coparent their children, sometimes bending
or even deliberately violating the tenets of the divorce decree because they did not need
to follow it. In turn, the structure of the divorce decree provided a foundation that either
guided or dictated coparents’ childrearing behavior. Coparents in this study were by no
means passive recipients or followers of the dictates of the divorce decree; they actively
created and recreated (and even changed through the motion to modify process) the divorce decree through creative and purposeful activity.
Limitations and suggestions for future research
Our study has several limitations that suggest directions for future research. First, with
one exception, we examined the perspective of only one member of the coparent team.
Thus, we can make no claims about how the other coparents view the divorce decree and
how it is used.We recommend that future research gathers the perspectives of multiple
parents in the coparenting system. Second, we only gathered the perspectives of parents
and not children. It would be interesting to determine the extent to which children are
aware of the divorce decree, and believe that it influences interactions in their families.
Third, and related to the second limitation, we were not able to examine how the use of
the divorce decree is related to the age of the children. Because children spend more time
with their friends and are more autonomous as they become older, we suspect that coparents will feel more pressure to use the divorce decree as a guide as their children age.
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Fourth, even though diary data were gathered over a 2-week period, our interview data
are basically cross-sectional. Consequently, we can only speculate about changes over time
in how coparents use the divorce decree as a structure that influences their interactions.
For example, we propose that couples in the early stages of their divorce may find it necessary to use the divorce decree as a legal contract and that, in some couples, there may be an
increase in the use of the divorce decree as a guide over time.
Fifth, because we did not initiate the original project with the goal of exploring the divorce decree, there is a considerable amount of information related to the divorce decree
that we did not collect. For example, we suspect that the amount of conflict involved in
negotiations surrounding the divorce settlement would influence how the divorce decree
structures later coparenting interactions. Those parents who had more disagreements in
negotiating the terms of the divorce may be less able to use the divorce decree as a guide,
rather than as a legal contract. In future research, we recommend that this issue, as well as
others related to the divorce settlement process, be examined.
Finally, the divorce decree involves individuals and institutions beyond the family. For
example, lawyers, mediators, judges, and counselors all may play a role in the process of
how the divorce decree is developed and how it is later used to guide coparenting interactions. We recommend that future researchers ask parents about how these other constituencies influence how the divorce decree affects their coparenting behavior, as well as
interview members of these outside institutions regarding their impressions of how the
divorce decree serves as a legal or guiding structure.
Notes
1. Transcripts are referenced by interview number, followed by line number.
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